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Abstract. Determiner phrases (DPs) under intensional operators (e.g., want, believe, 
must, may) give rise to multiple interpretations, known as the de re/de dicto ambigui-
ty. Formal theoretical approaches to modeling this ambiguity must rely on nuanced 
semantic judgments, but inconsistent judgments in the literature suggest that infor-
mal judgment collection may be insufficient. In addition, little is known about how 
these ambiguities are resolved in a context and how preferences between these read-
ings vary by contexts and across individuals, etc. We reported three controlled 
experiments to systemize the truth-value judgment collection of de re/de dicto read-
ings. While the de dicto readings were robustly accepted by nearly all English 
speakers, de re readings exhibited strongly bimodal judgments, suggesting an inher-
ent disagreement among speakers. In addition, the acceptability of de re judgments 
was affected by the DP’s internal structure as well as idiosyncratic scenarios. More 
broadly, our experimental results lend support to the practice of including quantita-
tive data collection within semantics. 
Keywords. de re/de dicto ambiguity; truth-value judgment; quantitative method 
1. Introduction.  In natural language semantics, the de re/de dicto ambiguity captures the refer-
ential properties of determiner phrases (DPs) in intensional domains1. When the intensional 
operator is an attitude predicate (e.g., want, believe), DPs read de re refer via a description that 
holds in the context of the speaker; the attitude holder introduced by the target sentence needs 
not commit to the referential association between the linguistic expression and its referent. In 
contrast, DPs read de dicto have descriptions that need only hold in the possible worlds intro-
duced by the intensional operator associated with the attitude holder, and consequently, the 
referential association might not hold for the speaker. For a concrete example, first consider the 
intensional predicate want and the indefinite DP a prince: in the sentence Aurora wants to marry 
a prince with the de re reading, the speaker communicates that there is a specific prince that Au-
rora wants to marry, even if Aurora does not recognize him as a prince, while under the de dicto 
reading, the speaker would be informing us that Aurora wants to marry whoever is a prince. (The 
first is true in the world of Sleeping Beauty; the second is false.) A (mostly, although not entire-
ly) parallel situation happens with definite DPs: the sentence Aurora wants to marry the prince, 
under what we will call its de re reading, is true when Aurora’s desires include marrying a spe-
                                               
* Many thanks to Shannon Bryant, Gennaro Chierchia, Judith Degen, Masoud Jasbi, Joshua Martin, Giuseppe 
Riccardi, Jack Robinovitch, Uli Sauerland, Jesse Snedeker, Julia Sturm, and audiences at the M&M Linguistics 
Laboratory, Harvard LangCog Workshop, and ELM 1 for critical feedback (mistakes are our own). Thanks to Yilan 
Wang for the assistance with the experiment pictures. Data collection was supported by a Graduate Student Re-
search Grant from Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University awarded to YZ. Authors: Yuhan 
Zhang (yuz551@g.harvard.edu) and Kathryn Davidson (kathryndavidson@fas.harvard.edu), Harvard University. 
1 As early as Aristotle, linguistic phenomena related to de re/de dicto have been observed. Yet this pair of Lat-
in terms was not intensively applied until the Medieval period by Thomas Aquinas. The adoption of the terms in 
philosophy and linguistics was initiated by Frege, Russell, and Quine but the current sense of de re and de dicto is 
not directly or intuitively related to the literal Latin meaning of the terminology (de re: ‘of the thing’, de dicto: ‘of 
what is said’) (von Fintel & Heim, 2011). Therefore, it is clearer to introduce the de re/de dicto distinction via con-
textualized examples. For more details of the nomenclature, see Keshet and Schwarz (2019).  
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cific person who is a prince in the actual world, even if she does not realize that he is the prince. 
What we will call here its de dicto reading is true when Aurora’s desires include “marrying the 
prince”, even if she is mistaken about who the prince may be. 
In this paper, we examine current semantic judgment collection methods for formal theories 
of the de re/de dicto ambiguity. We report three novel experiments which highlight some ad-
vantages of obtaining quantitative judgments for readings with this ambiguity, focusing on 
definite DPs, given that they have already generated some judgment inconsistency in the litera-
ture. In the first section, we lay out the existing theoretical landscape and raise the motivation for 
the quantitative approach. In the second section, we report three controlled truth-value judgment 
experiments that tested whether the inconsistency also existed among multiple native English 
speakers. In the final section, we endeavor to account for the observed judgment variation. 
1.1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CURRENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS.  A traditional approach to the 
de re/de dicto distinction models it as a scope ambiguity: in the logical form de re (but not de 
dicto) DPs outscope the intensional operator to obtain the reading assigned in the actual world, as 
in (1) (see Russell 1905, Fodor 1970, Cresswell & von Stechow 1982 among others). 
 
 (1)     Aurora wants to marry a prince. 
          de re LF: ∃x[princew0(x) Ù "w[BELw0(Aurora, w) ⟶ [marryw(Aurora)(x)]]] 
 de dicto LF: "w[BELw0(Aurora, w) ⟶ ∃x[princew(x) Ù marryw(Aurora)(x)]] 
 
While this theory can capture the distinction for simple (indefinite) DPs as in (1), when they 
appear under quantification the outscoped de re reading diverges nontrivially from the intended 
reading. In response, Percus (2000) proposes a solution using situation pronouns. Every verb 
phrase (VP) and noun phrase (NP) takes a situation pronoun as an unpronounced intensional 
variable that is bound by a higher lambda abstractor to get its world assignment. In this way, DPs 
can attain the de re interpretation via the logical binding of intensional variables while remaining 
in-situ. However, situation pronouns overgenerate, predicting readings not attested in natural 
language, resulting in a proposal by Keshet (2008, 2011) known as split intensionality, a return 
to the traditional scope-based theory with the employment of a type-shifting operator associated 
with an intensional operator. Raising a DP above this operator but below the intensional operator 
not only makes the DP an intensional argument, but also assigns it a different world index from 
the matrix clause. Consequently, DPs can be interpreted de re once they are raised above the 
type-shifting operator while remaining in the scope of the intensional operators. However, nei-
ther the scope-based theories nor the situation pronoun theory can adequately account for the 
“multiple-guise” scenario raised by Quine (1956), and consequently the theory of de re readings 
has been enriched by the addition of concept generators (see (4) below), permitting de re read-
ings without movement (Percus & Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006, Charlow & Sharvit 2014).  
The de re/de dicto distinction illustrates how formal theories evolve in response to new 
pieces of linguistic observation. Importantly, these linguistic observations not only include the 
well-formedness of a sentence, but also its truth-value judgment offered by linguists given a cor-
responding scenario. Given the complexity of the data (especially the context/scenario) involved 
in de re/de dicto judgements, we find it unsurprising that there is some judgment inconsistency 
from existing publications. We review some inconsistencies in the next section, and conclude 
that they call for a more consistent judgment collection approach, an approach that generates, in 
Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015)’s term, “stable, replicable, and transparent” judgments for 
observations of the same kind in the collection of such layered semantic data. 
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1.2. THE NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH.  Inconsistencies found in linguistics and relevant 
fields constitute our motivation for the current study. In the linguistic theory literature, there exist 
some inconsistent de re judgments about the same DP structure in nearly identical linguistic en-
vironments. For instance, von Fintel and Heim (2011) employ sentence (2) to argue that the DP 
your abstract exhibits genuine ambiguity of de re and de dicto interpretations, while Nelson 
(2019) argues that the target DP her brother in (3), which has the same internal structure as your 
abstract, cannot be interpreted de re.  
 
(2)  John believes that [your abstract]de re will be accepted.  
 de re truth condition:  
 John reviewed an amazing abstract and thought that it will be accepted. The speaker of 
 this belief report has the additional knowledge that the abstract is written by the addressee 
 “you” and thus utters (2), while John does not know the authorship of the abstract. 
 (von Fintel and Heim 2001:157) 
 
(3)  # Sally believes that [her brother]de re is happy.  
 (Supposed) de re truth condition:  
Sally hears a person laughing outside on the street who happens to be her brother. She be-
lieves that the person is happy, even though she does not recognize him as her brother. 
(Nelson 2019:13) 
 
Nelson’s reason to deny the de re reading is that the belief holder Sally does not conceive of the 
person—Sally’s brother in real world—as her brother. Nelson takes Sally’s perspective and ar-
gues that de re should not be true given the scenario, while von Fintel and Heim claim that de re 
readings are a regular natural language phenomenon. One may wonder whether Nelson’s reason-
ing is representative of a dispreference for de re: to test this, it helps to gather judgment data 
across a wider variety of scenarios. Or, perhaps particular linguistic features, e.g., your vs. her, 
or the inanimate vs. animate possessees, contribute to the unexpected judgment inconsistency. 
Or, perhaps individuals vary in their preferred readings when faced with ambiguity. Controlled 
scenarios, examples, and a broader population allow us to test these hypotheses. 
Further inconsistency in the linguistics literature arises in more complex cases. Charlow and 
Sharvit (2014) note one such disagreement: while they claim that the possessee mother in (4) 
should be de dicto, they report that another linguist who works on the same phenomenon finds it 
more natural under a de re reading.  
 
(4) John believes that [every female studenti]de re likes [heri]de re [mother]de dicto.  
      LF: John believes-w0 
     [λ8 λ9 λ1 [every female student-w0 
                                [λ2[[G8 t2]-w1 likes-w1 [G9 her2]-w1 mother-w1]]]] 
 
 Truth condition of a “multiple-guise” scenario:  
John comes into contact with every actual female student more than once, and each actual 
female student appears each time in a different guise. The same woman appears in two dif-
ferent guises and John fails to recognize this. He thinks he came into contact with two 
different women. Furthermore, in John’s mind, the mapping between the different guises 
is one-to-one. The sentence is about a specific scenario when John believes that a likes b’s 
mother, c likes d’s mother, and e likes f’s mother when in reality, a = b, c = d, and e = f. 
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Outside of theoretical linguistics, real-life instances provide data that are occasionally unex-
pected given theoretical predictions. While it is claimed that cardinal DPs cannot be interpreted 
de re (Musan 1995, Keshet 2008, Romoli & Sudo 2009), sentence (5), an utterance collected at 
an economic conference reported on Language Log by Liberman (2005), suggests otherwise.  
 
(5)  U.S. forces in Iraq have intentionally killed [12 journalists]de re. 
 de re truth condition:  
There were 12 journalists killed by the U.S. forces in an attack but the forces did not know 
the people they killed were journalists. 
        (Liberman on October 23, 2005) 
 
Moreover, outside linguistics, researchers in related fields (i.e., philosophy, psychology, 
law) have claimed that the de re reading is easier to obtain in scenarios where both de re and de 
dicto are admitted, which is not (as far as we know) a claim that has been made within linguis-
tics. In philosophy, Jaszczolt (1997) maintains that the directly referential property of definite 
noun phrases is more salient in communication and thus argues for a “default de re reading”. Her 
perspective finds its allies in cognitive science and developmental psychology. For example, 
when a participant and a character/protagonist in an experiment both know the identity of an 
object but the protagonist remains partially ignorant of the object’s certain properties, both chil-
dren and adult participants fail to restrict their description to the properties already known by the 
protagonist to refer to the object when put into the protagonist’s shoes (Mitchell et al. 1996, 
Apperly & Robinson 2003, Apperly & Butterfill 2009, Low & Watts 2013). These observations 
suggest an egocentrism or reality bias explanation and the easiness of accessing information in 
actual reality but not others’ mental status may bias one to expect something like a “default de 
re” hypothesis. This bias is also bolstered in legal settings where the focus on a literal interpreta-
tion of the defendant’s action rather than his intention to conduct such action during jury 
procedure echoes the “default de re” claim (Anderson 2013). 
Despite the observed judgment inconsistency in linguistics literature and the “default de re” 
claim outside linguistics, there has been no experimental work, that we are aware of, that directly 
looks at the judgment preferences for de re/de dicto readings in a given scenario. While Hackl et 
al. (2009) has studied transparent versus opaque readings in intensional transitive predicates 
using online reading times and gathered evidence supporting the scope-based theory over the 
situation pronoun approach, their finding—QRed transparent DPs facilitate the processing of the 
following ACD site—does not directly address the judgment inconsistencies introduced above.  
Fortunately, crowdsourcing techniques offer a systematic solution. By gathering offline 
judgments from multiple native speakers, we can detect whether the observed inconsistency re-
sults from idiosyncratic noises or inherent disagreement; by creating multiple scenarios to test a 
single phenomenon, we can confirm whether the judgment is robust to more variation. Crucially, 
by comparing the de re and de dicto readings of the same sentence under minimally different 
contexts, we can attempt a fair comparison of the judgment pattern and hopefully understand 
factors involved in different preferences for these readings. In sum, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the de re/de dicto literature can benefit from more quantitative methods.  
1.3. RESEARCH GOAL.  We aim to set up a simple and efficient experimental template for system-
atically obtaining stable, replicable, and transparent judgments of de re/de dicto readings across 
carefully controlled scenarios. We focus on definite DPs since several above examples with 
questionable judgments are definite (e.g., your abstract, her mother), although we note that this 
definite non-de re reading differs from the traditional de dicto exhibited by indefinite DPs. 
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2. Experiment One.  Experiment 1 used highly controlled scenarios that permitted both de re 
and de dicto readings of definite DPs to probe its judgment pattern from native English speakers. 
2.1. PARTICIPANTS.  120 adult native English speakers were recruited through Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk. They received $2 compensation for finishing the experiment. 
2.2. MATERIALS AND DESIGN.  In this experiment, participants read four written scenarios and 
gave their judgment of a target sentence based on each scenario (an example in Table 12).  
 
CONTEXT 
Julie is one of the judges of an ongoing poetry competition. The best poem that she 
has read so far is an extremely intriguing poem about the ocean. She believes that this 
poem will win the competition. Julie remembers being told that Nicole, one of the best-
known poets, submitted a poem about the ocean to the competition. Therefore, Julie con-
cludes that this poem must be written by Nicole and the first prize will be going to her. 
However, this poem was actually written by Elizabeth, a younger and lesser-known poet. 
It is just a coincidence that the two poets wrote about the same topic. 
 
JUDGMENT QUESTION 
According to this story, please use the slider bar to indicate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the following statement. 
 
Target Sentence I:   
Julie believes that Elizabeth’s poem will win the competition. (de re) 
Target Sentence II:  
Julie believes that Nicole’s poem will win the competition. (de dicto) 
 
 
Table 1: Example scenario in Exp.1 
 
In each scenario, there were two terms that described the target object (e.g., poe m). The 
protagonist (e.g., Julie) associated one term X (e.g., Nicole’s poem) with the target object but in 
reality, X was not correct and the correct descriptive term Y (e.g., Elizabeth’s poem) was not 
known by the protagonist. If the wrong term X was used in reporting the protagonist’s belief, a 
de dicto reading would emerge; if the correct term Y was used a de re reading would emerge. 
Given this scenario, both readings were predicted to be true (e.g., Romoli & Sudo 2009). 
In each scenario, the participants read one of the two target sentences (Target Sentence I or 
Target Sentence II, varied between participants) and dragged a slider bar to show the extent to 
which they agree or disagree. After the participants’ decision, a numeric judgment score was 
recorded (from “highly agree” = 100 to “highly disagree” = −100). Three sanity check sentences 
were additionally provided in each scenario—one was definitely correct, one was definitely 
wrong, and the last was uncertain. Successful judgments on these sentences indicated the partici-
                                               
2 The full experiment material and the statistical analysis in Exp.1-3 can be accessed via https://osf.io/qgnr5/.  
  The online survey can be accessed via https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_01UTaqO9hkkAcGF. 
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pants were attentive and thus eligible for inclusion in the data analysis. The advantage of a slider 
bar is its greater sensitivity to reveal potential judgments that would otherwise stay concealed 
due to the strong categorical implication in designs like the binary or the Likert scale (Marty et 
al. 2020). 
Each participant read four scenarios and each scenario was coupled with four sentences for 
judgment elicitation. Two of the four scenarios were randomly chosen for the de re condition and 
the other two for the de dicto condition. The participants were randomly assigned to one of six 
lists created for Latin Square design. The order of the four stories was randomized, as was the 
order of the four sentences within each scenario. The entire survey was created on Qualtrics and 
distributed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
2.3. RESULTS.  We analyzed only the responses from participants who correctly judged the cor-
rect and incorrect sanity checks at least 75% of the time. 115 participants’ data (95.8%) were 
retained for the analysis. 
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the judgment distribution of de re/de dicto sentences 
across all scenarios. While judgments for de dicto readings overwhelmingly aggregate toward 
the “highly agree” end, judgments for de re readings are bimodal—although more than half of 
the judgments are agreed with, another sizable proportion goes to the “highly disagree” edge.  
We further analyzed the agreement proportion in each scenario, assuming it was appropriate 
to treat the continuous judgment as a binary variable given its categorial distribution. In Figure 2, 
the de dicto agreement rates are at ceiling for all scenarios while de re judgments exhibit larger 




Figure 1 & 2: Histogram distribution of judgments; Agreement rate on condition and scenario3 
 
The visual difference of de re/de dicto condition was confirmed by a mixed-effects logistic 
regression analysis. By treating the de re/de dicto conditions and the scenario as sum-encoded 
fixed effects with a random intercept on participants, we found that the de re trials were signifi-
cantly less likely to be agreed with compared with a random trial (β = −1.61, SE = 0.23, p < 
.001); additionally, Scenario b had a significantly higher agreement rate (β = 0.96, SE = 0.30, p = 
.001) while Scenario c had a significantly lower one (β = −0.81, SE = 0.24, p < .001)4.  
                                               
3 The error bars in Figure 2 represent 95% confidence intervals sampled via random bootstrapping.  
4 The syntax of the model is “logit(agree) ~ condition + context + (1|subject)”. We also ran another model 
“logit(agree) ~ condition * context + (1|subject)” but didn’t find significant improvement from the reported one. The 
models were run using R with package lme4. The reason to treat scenario as a fixed effect rather than a random 
effect was that it was also of theoretical interests and that its number (N = 4) was not eligible for a random effect. 
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Additionally, we explored whether groups of participants had different judgment behavior, 
exhibited in Table 2. Clearly, a preponderance of participants agreed with both de dicto trials 
while the judgment behavior for de re had three representative groups, suggesting that an inher-
ent disagreement among speakers or an unplanned scenario effect may both contribute to this 
distinctive participant behavior of interpreting de re.5 
2.4. DISCUSSION.  By setting up scenarios that theoretically allow both de re and de dicto read-
ings of definite DPs and eliciting native speakers’ judgments, we found that while de dicto 
readings were unanimously available to participants, de re readings exhibited bimodal judgments 
with larger variations across scenarios and speakers. The sizable disagreement proportion and 
bimodal pattern suggest systematicity within the previously observed inconsistency in the litera-
ture. 
 
# of Participants Agree with 0 trial Agree with 1 trial Agree with 2 trials Total 
de re 21 (18.3%) 45 (36.5%) 52 (45.2%) 115 
de dicto 0 (0.0%) 7 (6.1%) 108 (93.9%) 115 
 
Table 2: Proportion of participants by the judgment behavior 
 
3. Experiments Two and Three.  While Experiment 1 probed the judgement distribution for de 
re and de dicto readings of definite DPs (in particular, possessive constructions) in relatively 
simple sentences, Experiments 2 and 3 asked whether the judgment disparity could extend to 
other DP structures or more sophisticated sentences. Driven by such kind of motivation, we stud-
ied the nuanced case of bound de re observed in Charlow and Sharvit (2014) for sentences like 
John believes that every female studenti likes heri mother (above in (4)). The crucial bound de re 
assigns the QNP every female student and the possessive pronoun her a de re reading. The read-
ing of mother is less critical for theoretical choices, but given these sentences were reported to 
have inconsistent judgments, we decided it was also worth investigating.  
3.1. PARTICIPANTS.  160 participants in Experiment 2 and 128 in Experiment 3 took the tasks for 
$2 on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After applying the same filter as in Experiment 1, 127 partic-
ipants (79.38%) in Experiment 2 and 120 (93.75%) in Experiment 3 contributed to the analysis6.  
3.2. METHODS.  We treated the de re/de dicto reading of QNP as a between-experiments manipu-
lation (de re in Experiment 2 and de dicto in Experiment 3) so that the possessive pronoun and 
the possessee, serving as two within-subjects manipulations, took either de re or de dicto read-
ings within one experiment. Focusing on a 2 X 2 within-subjects manipulation within an 
experiment prevented participants from reading more than four complex scenarios and getting 
fatigued.  
The general design was nearly the same as Experiment 1. The most significant difference is 
that while Experiment 1 had each scenario allow both de re and de dicto readings, Experiments 2 
and 3 were designed such that each scenario supported (i.e., made true) one reading, with the 
target sentence held constant and the scenario manipulated across conditions. There were also 
illustrative pictures to facilitate processing (see an example in Table 3). Furthermore, Experi-
ments 2 and 3 had the same randomization, counterbalance, and filler design as Experiment 1.  
 
                                               
5 Thanks to Alexander Göbel for pointing to this inter-speaker investigation. 
6 The lower inclusion rate in Experiment 2 was because those participants were recruited on weekends when it 
is more challenging to gather good data via online implementation.  
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CONTEXT 
As a photographer, John likes to rearrange his collections of photographs. One day, 
he encounters two sets of photos. In the first set, there are three ladies and each is holding 




In the second set, three young adults are each wearing a T-shirt with a “2018” logo. 
John naturally believes that they were graduating students in the year 2018. John also 
notices that, interestingly, each of the young adults shares a similar smile to one of the 
ladies in the first photo set. He tries to recall if there is a connection between the young 




As a matter of fact, what John fails to recall is three pieces of information. (1) The 
young adults in the second set of photos were the babies in the first set. They’ve grown 
up! (2) The ladies in the first set are actually the babies’ grandmother. The three young 
adults inherit their smile from their grandma who is mistakenly believed by John to be 
their mother. (3) The second set of photos were taken not in the graduation ceremony but 
when the three adults were volunteering for an academic conference in 2018. 
Despite the fact that John doesn’t remember the correct relationship between the la-
dies in the first set of photos and the young adults in the second set and that he has 
incorrect information, John spends some time appreciating these photos. 
 
JUDGMENT QUESTION 
According to this story, please use the slider bar to indicate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the following statement. 
 
Target sentence:  Looking at his photos, John believes that [every conference volunteer]de 





Table 3: The canonical bound de re scenario, adapted from Charlow & Sharvit (2014) 
3.3. RESULTS.  Figure 3 shows that consistent with Experiment 1, judgments tend to gather 
around both scale ends. Crucially, there is still a salient proportion of disagreement for the bound 
de re case compared with the “control” condition where all three nominal constructions were de 
dicto. Figure 4 shows the agreement rate of the eight conditions in eight columns. The second 
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column represents the canonical bound de re condition whose agreement rate is slightly above 
the chance level. Overall, the de re condition of the possessee leads to a lower agreement rate 
than the de dicto condition (𝜒2 = 23.63, df = 1, p < .001). Figure 5 displays the agreement rates 
by the condition manipulation and the scenarios. A visual examination shows a clear scenario 
effect because of the conspicuous lowering agreement rate in Scenario 4 whose peculiarity is 




Figure 2: Agreement distribution in Experiments 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure 4 & 3: Agreement proportion among conditions (4); and scenarios (5) 
 
The effects of de re/de dicto manipulation were further analyzed via a logistic mixed-effects 
model. The maximal model had one random intercept on participants and three fixed-effects var-
iables to indicate the de re/de dicto assignment of the three nominal terms. The fourth fixed-
effect variable was the story plus an interaction term between the story and each of the three 
nominal terms7. All the fixed effects were sum-coded.  
The results show that while de re QNPs did not significantly affect the agreement rate (β = 
−0.06, SE = 0.10, p = .561), de re possessive pronouns (β = −0.19, SE = 0.08, p = .02) and de re 
possessees (β = −0.42, SE = 0.08, p < .001) did significantly lower the rate. Compared with the 
                                               
7 The syntax of the model is “logit(agree) ~ (QNP + pronoun + possessee)*story + (1|subject)”. We’ve also fit-
ted another model “logit(agree) ~ QNP + pronoun + possessee + story + (1|subject)” but the anova() test showed the 
former one outperformed the latter. 
bound de re 
control 
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average agreement rate across the four scenarios and controlling the reading assignments of the 
three terms, Scenario 2 (β = 0.96, SE = 0.15, p < .001) and 3 (β = 0.41, SE = 0.14, p = .003) were 
more likely to be agreed upon (more analysis on https://osf.io/qgnr5/). 
3.4. DISCUSSION.  Experiments 2 and 3 tested the judgment of de re and de dicto in the bound de 
re type sentence and found that the canonical bound de re structure ([QNP]de re, [Possessive pro-
noun]de re, [Possessee]de dicto) was agreed with more than 50% of the time, but at the same time 
(and, like de re readings generally) obtained salient disagreements. In general, Experiments 2 
and 3 replicated the finding of Experiment 1 in showing that de re readings lead to bimodal 
judgment. An additional result here is that the agreement rate of de re appears dependent on the 
DP’s internal structure and/or position—the effect of de re/de dicto variation on the agreement 
rate was significant for the possessive pronouns and possessees but nearly negligible for QNPs. 
Furthermore, the judgment was also affected by specific scenarios (e.g., peculiar Scenario 4).  
Furthermore, the salient difference in de re and de dicto readings of the possessee doesn’t 
support the challenge that a de re possessee is more natural, but rather is in line with Charlow 
and Sharvit (2014)’s main argument. The lack of effect for QNPs echoes numerous observations 
in theoretical work that both de re and de dicto readings for QNPs are felicitous (e.g., Mary 
1978, Keshet 2008, Romoli & Sudo 2009 among others). Going back to the claim of bound de re 
in Charlow and Sharvit (2014), these two experiments suggest that (a) bound de re does exist for 
many speakers, but also that (b) not everyone agrees. 
4. Conclusion and Discussion.  In a series of three experiments, we provided some quantitative 
evidence that there is a truth-value judgment disparity between de re and de dicto readings of 
definite DPs, both in simple attitude reports and more complex ones. In particular, we showed 
that there is a systematic inconsistency for de re judgments: the bimodal distribution is far from 
the uniform or normal distribution, and we note that this pattern of bimodal agreement would 
have been impossible to detect without quantitative methods that used response options more 
sensitive than a binary true/false (here, we used a slider bar). This inconsistency occurred not 
only in Experiment 1 where the scenarios admitted both readings, but also in Experiments 2 and 
3 where the complex scenarios were controlled to admit only a single interpretation: even when 
it was the only one supported/true in the given scenario, de re readings had bimodal acceptance 
while de dicto readings were overwhelmingly accepted. Other relevant factors that also appear to 
affect judgments include the internal structure of the DPs (e.g., possessive, quantificational, etc.) 
and features of the idiosyncratic scenarios. 
While de re readings of combinations of other types of DP structures (including, crucially, 
indefinite DPs) and other kinds of attitude reports and intensional operators await testing, it is 
worth considering what may have led to disagreements in Experiments 1 to 3. One cause might 
be that participants possess different grammars or dialects and one variation disallows the de re 
reading. This has to do with grammar variation and without information about the participants’ 
linguistic profile, this claim stays as a speculation. Another cause might be related to the scenario 
setup where the juxtaposition of de re and de dicto terms in the written scenario enhances partic-
ipants’ sensitivity to which term is used for reference in which possible world. The contrastive 
information evaluated in two parallel worlds could be well tracked by the participants and thus 
when their incremental comprehension starts from, for example, Julie believes that…, there is a 
chance that they only attend to what Julie believes and subsequently to descriptive terms held 
true in Julie’s belief world. A de dicto DP naturally matches what the belief holder expects and 
thus is highly agreed upon, while encountering a de re DP whose referential relation to the entity 
is not held in Julie’s mind could raise disagreement (as the case in example (3) raised by Nelson 
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(2019)). This sensitivity to the contrast also alludes to Theory of Mind ability and reasoning with 
perspective shifting (Wimmer & Perner 1983, Apperly & Butterfill 2009, Low & Watts 2013). 
For further investigation along these lines, it may be informative to experimentally test whether 
the contrast of de re and de dicto terms in the scenario influences de re judgment. That is, if there 
is no contrastive term such as Nicole’s poem vs. Elizabeth’s poem in one scenario but just one de 
re term unknown to the belief holder, what might be the de re agreement rate? If agreement in-
creases, then we may conclude that the contrastive information may contribute to the high 
disagreement proportion of de re.  
To conclude, our findings highlight the value of including quantitative methods as the basis 
for theoretical work, especially when the linguistic observation in question raises inconsistent 
judgments, as in the case of de re readings for definite DPs. The essential advantage of quantita-
tive research is that with multiple speakers, multiple scenarios, and controlled manipulation, it is 
possible to detect whether an inconsistency observed from limited cases (e.g., sentences (2) and 
(3)) is noise or true disagreement, and whether a preference for one reading is due to a minor 
contrast/preference or a grammatical unavailability. Here, we have uncovered evidence that in-
consistencies about the de re readings were not due to noise or uncertainty among participants 
(which would lead to more intermediate agreement responses) but rather to systematic bimodal 
judgments and affected by scenario and DP-specific factors. We speculate that our findings may 
be especially enlightening in the case of known semantic/scope ambiguities. What, then, to do 
with such results is an important question for theoreticians. We end by noting that these results 
did not even require researchers to create a massive number of scenarios to uncover these pat-
terns: in Experiments 1 to 3, a mere four scenarios—just “a little bit experimental” in Davidson 
(2020)’s term—were enough to observe this systematic disagreement, which held across each of 
the experiments. Lastly, we hope that this work will lead not just to more work along the de re/de 
dicto line, but contribute to the growing field of Experiments in Linguistic Meaning (ELM). 
 
References 
Anand, Pranav. 2006. De de se. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
Anderson, Jill C. 2013. Misreading like a lawyer: Cognitive bias in statutory interpretation. Har-
vard Law Review 127(6). 1–74.  
Apperly, Ian A. & Butterfill, Stephen A. 2009. Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and 
belief-like states? Psychological Review 116(4). 953–970. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016923 
Apperly, Ian A. & Robinson, E. J. 2003. When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence 
for systematic variation in 5- and 6-year-old children’s reasoning about beliefs and belief re-
ports. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 85(4). 297–311. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00099-7 
Charlow, Simon & Sharvit, Yael. 2014. Bound “de re” pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports. 
Semantics and Pragmatics 7(3). 1-43. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.7.3 
Cresswell, Maxwell J. & von Stechow, Arnim. 1982. De re belief generalized. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 5(4). 503–535. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355585 
Davidson, Kathryn. 2020. Is “experimental” a gradable predicate? Proceedings of North East 
Linguistics Society (NELS) 50. 
Fodor, Janet D. 1970. The Linguistic Description of Opaque Contexts. PhD Thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.  
Hackle, Martin, Koster-Moeller, Jorie, & Gottstein, Andrea. 2009. Processing opacity. Proceed-
ings of Sinn und Bedeutung 13. 171–185. 
Proceedings of ELM 1: 310-321, 2021
Yuhan Zhang and Kathryn Davidson:
De re interpretation in belief reports—An experimental investigation. 320
 
Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 1997. The ‘default de re’ principle for the interpretation of belief utterances. 
Journal of Pragmatics 28(3). 315–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166(97)00006-4 
Keshet, Ezra. 2008. Good intensions: Paving two roads to a theory of the de re / de dicto distinc-
tion. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Keshet, Ezra. 2011. Split intensionality: A new scope theory of de re and de dicto. Linguistics 
and Philosophy 33(4). 251–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-011-9081-x 
Keshet, Ezra & Schwarz, Florian. 2019. De Re/De Dicto. In Jeanette Gundel & Barbara Abbott 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Reference, 167–202. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.10 
Liberman, Mark. 2005. Rarely better than de re. Blog. Language Log. 
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/002573.html 
Low, Jason & Watts, Joseph. 2013. Attributing false beliefs about object identity reveals a signa-
ture blind spot in humans’ efficient mind-reading system. Psychological Science 24(3). 305–
311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612451469 
Marty, Paul, Chemla, Emmanuel, & Sprouse, Jon. 2020. The effect of three basic task features 
on the sensitivity of acceptability judgment tasks. Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics 
5(1). 72.1–23. https://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.980 
May, Robert C. 1978. The grammar of quantification. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.  
Mitchell, P., Robinson, E. J., Isaacs, J. E., & Nye, R. M. 1996. Contamination in reasoning about 
false belief: An instance of realist bias in adults but not children. Cognition 59(1). 1–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)00683-4 
Musan, Renate. 1995. On the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. PhD Thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. 
Nelson, Michael. 2019. The de re/de dicto distinction (Supplement to Propositional Attitude Re-
ports). In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics 
Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/prop-
attitude-reports/dere.html 
Percus, Orin. 2000. Constraints on some other variables in syntax. Natural Language Semantics 
8(3). 173–229. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011298526791 
Percus, Orin & Sauerland, Uli. 2003. On the LFs of attitude reports. Proceedings of Sinn und 
Bedeutung 7. 228–242. 
Quine, Willard V. 1956. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy 
53(5). 177–187. https://doi.org/10.2307/2022451 
Romoli, Jacopo & Sudo, Yasutada. 2009. De de/de dicto ambiguity and presupposition projec-
tion. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, 13. 
Russell, Bertrand. 1905. On Denoting. Mind 14(56). 479–493. 
Tonhauser, Judith & Matthewson, Lisa. 2015. Empirical evidence in research on meaning. Man-
uscript. 
von Fintel, Kai & Heim, Irene. 2011. Intensional Semantics. Manuscript. 
http://lingphil.mit.edu/papers/heim/fintel-heim-intensional.pdf 
Wimmer, Heinz & Perner, Josef. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining 
function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition 13. 
103–128. 
Proceedings of ELM 1: 310-321, 2021
Yuhan Zhang and Kathryn Davidson:
De re interpretation in belief reports—An experimental investigation. 321
